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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ST ATE OF GEORGIA

DONG FENG FANG, CHUN LEI FU,
MAO LIN WEI, and HONG MEl ZHOU,
Plaintiffs,
v.

HEI INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT VI, LLC,
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC,
DENNIS A. MERONEY, FREDERICK W.
CERRONE, FRIEDMAN, DEVER, &
MERLIN, LLC, and SHELDON E.
FRIEDMAN,
Defendants.
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HEr INVESTMENTS, LLC, HOTEL
EQUITIES DEVELOPMENT VI, LLC,
HOTEL EQUITIES GROUP, LLC,
DENNIS A. MERONEY, and FREDERICK
W. CERRONE,

)
)
)
)
)

Third Party Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

v.

HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY,
Third Party Defendant.

Civil Action File No. 2015-CV-261534

ORDER ON HEG DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This matter is before the Court on HEG Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' Tort Claims and Punitive Damage Claim. A judgment based on the
pleadings should be granted "After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c).

A

standard similar to summary judgment may be applied to judgment based on the pleadings. ld.
"For the purposes of the motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material
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allegations of the opposing party's pleadings are to be taken as true, and all allegations of the
moving party which have been denied are taken as false."

Blier v. Greene, 263 Ga. App. 35, 35

(2003). A defendant's motion should be granted if the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any state of provable facts. ConsolidatedPipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Genoa Canst. Servs.,
Inc., 279 Ga. App. 894, 896 (2006). "(A) judgment on the pleadings cannot be granted unless
the pleadings affirmatively show that no claim in fact exists." Gray v. Mckenna, 202 Ga. App.
685,685 (1992) (citing Bacon v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Ga. App. 436 (1991».

Having

considered the briefing of all parties on the Motion and the relevant case and statutory law on the
matter, the Court finds as follows:
Defendants Hotel Equities Group, LLC, HEI Investments, LLC, Hotel Equities
Development III, LLC, Frederick W. Cerrone, and Dennis A. Meroney (collectively "HEG
Defendants") sought investors for a hotel development in Dalton, Georgia. Plaintiffs Fang, Fu,
Wei, and Zhou invested approximately $1.7 million in HEI, the entity that was to construct the
hotel, in exchange for Preferred Units of Membership Interest ("Units") in HE!. The money was
wired to Friedman, Dever & Merlin, LLC ("FDM") and Sheldon E. Friedman, the attorneys
representing the HEG Defendants, and placed in a trust account for safekeeping. This escrow
account was created and entrusted in accordance with the Private Placement Memorandum
("PPM") and the Subscription Agreements. Plaintiffs' money was to be held in escrow, only to
be released to HEI when eleven Units in HEI were sold. If the remaining Units were not sold,
Plaintiffs could request a return of their investments. The remaining Units were not sold by the
deadline and Plaintiffs withdrew their subscriptions, demanding refunds. However, Plaintiffs did
not receive repayment from Defendants. Instead, the money was released to Black Diamond, a
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non-party prospective lender from New Jersey, without informing Plaintiffs or obtaining consent
from them about the action.
Plaintiffs filed suit against HEG Defendants, FDM, and Friedman, alleging: (1)
conversion and trover, (2) money had and received, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) promissory
estoppel, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of fiduciary duty, (7) breach of trust, (8) breach of
constructive trust, (9) fraud, (10) negligent misrepresentation,

(I}) recovery of money illegally

paid, (12) liability of agent for excess of authority, (13) joint liability for and malicious
procurement of conversion, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud, (14) ratification
of conversion, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, I (18) negligence, (19)

attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, and (20) punitive, deterrence, and exemplary damages.
HEG Defendants filed a third party complaint against its insurer, Hanover Insurance Company
("Hanover") seeking indemnity and defense. However, the Court granted Hanover's motion for
summary judgment because Exclusion N2 in the insurance contract expressly excluded coverage
of any claim "directly or indirectly based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or
alleged liability under a written or oral contract or agreement." After consideration of the facts
and circumstances alleged, the Court determined that all twenty counts relied on the same set of
facts, and that none of Plaintiffs' claims would exist but for Plaintiffs' relationship with HEG
Defendants as established by the Subscription Agreements and the PPM. The Court rejected
HEG Defendants' argument that several claims, like unjust enrichment and money had and
I
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Counts 15, 16, and 17 were dismissed in this Court's Order on Motions to Dismiss dated March 7, 2016.
Exclusion N excludes from coverage:
" 'Loss' on account of any 'Claim' made against any 'Insured' directly or indirectly based upon,
arising out of, or attributable to any actual or alleged liability under a written or oral contract or
agreement. However, this exclusion does not apply to your liability that would have attached in
the absence of such contract or agreement."

Exclusion IY.N of the D&O Coverage Part ("Exclusion N").

3

received, could only be brought in the absence of a contract and thus, the claims were not subject
to Exclusion N. The Court focused on the "genesis of the claims" and whether the claims "were
in any way connected with the breach of contract." See City of College Park v. GIRMA, 313 Ga.

App. 239,245 (2011) ("the underlying facts and circumstances of the claims asserted, rather than
the theory of the claims, determine whether the exclusion applies"). The Court noted that
Plaintiffs had not alleged HEG Defendants had a duty to them independent of the Subscription
Agreements. HEG Defendants put much emphasis on this language in the Order. More
precisely stated, however, Plaintiffs did not allege a claim against HEG Defendants that did not
factually relate directly or indirectly to the Subscription Agreements. Given the Court's
conclusion that all the claims arose directly or indirectly from a contract or agreement, HEG
Defendants now seek dismissal of all claims sounding in tort and for punitive damagea'
The Court finds that it ruling in its Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
regarding the applicability of Exclusion N is not determinative whether the duties allegedly
breached by HEG Defendants arose from a contract or independent of it. "It is well settled that
mere failure to perform a contract does not constitute a tort. A plaintiff in a breach of contract
case has a tort claim only where, in addition to breaching the contract, the defendant also
breaches an independent duty imposed by law." ServiceMaster Co., LP v. Martin, 252 Ga. App.
751,754 (2001). A single act could create both contract and tort causes of action, dependent on
whether the purportedly breached duty arose from a contract or independent of it. Foster
Wheeler Corp v. Georgia Power Co., 140 Ga. App. 261, 265-66 (1976). For an action to be a
tort, not a contract breach, the duty imposed could be either through a "valid statutory enactment
of the legislature or a duty imposed by a recognized common law principle declared in the
While HEG Defendants are arguing that the tort claims must fail, they are simultaneously appealing the Court's
Order on Cross-Summary Judgment Motions arguing that tort claims exist independent of a contract, and thus
Hanover is required to provide insurance coverage. They have also denied the existence of a final, binding contract.
3
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reported decisions of (our) appellate courts." Peterson v. First Clayton Bank & Trust Co., 214

Ga. App. 94, 99 (1994). The question of duty is for the Court to determine, not the trier of fact.
Adler's Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 72 (1989).
The exclusion for claims covered under the insurance contract is not co-extensive to
Georgia's common law excluding tort claims when the duty breached is dependent on a contract.
The insurance exclusion barred coverage of all claims, regardless of whether they would be
barred otherwise, of all claims arising directly or indirectly from the existence of a contract,
based on the facts and circumstances. Whether a duty arises contractually or independent of a
contract is a separate inquiry. A claim may be indirectly related to the existence of a contract
and thus excluded from coverage under the insurance policy, and yet the duty may arise
independent of the express terms of the contract at issue.
As such, REG Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Plaintiffs' Tort
Claims and Punitive Damage Claim is DENIED. REG Defendants request the Court award
attorneys' fees incurred from responding to this motion under O.CG.A. § 9-15-14. That request
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this

1111-

day of August, 2016.

~L~~K~
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Edwin J. Schklar
Maggie M. Heim
SCHKLAR & HElM, LLC
945 East Paces Ferry Road
Suite 2250, Resurgens Plaza
Atlanta, Georgia 30326
Tel: (404) 888-0100
Fax: (404) 888-0001
Edwin@atlantalawfirm.net
Maggie@atlantalawfirm.net

Christine L. Mast
Joseph H. Wieseman
HA WKTNS, PARNELL, THACKSTON &
YOUNG LLP
4000 SunTrust Plaza
303 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30308-3243
Tel: (404) 614-7400
Fax: (404) 614-7500
cmast@hptylaw.com
jwieseman@hptylaw.com
For DefendantsFriedman, Dever & Merlin,

Kevin Maxim
THE MAXIM LAW FIRM, P.C.
1718 Peachtree St., NW, Ste. 599
Atlanta, GA 30309
krnaxim@maximlawfirm.com

LLC and Sheldon E. Friedman

,

Stephen V. Kern
C. Joseph Hoffman
KITCHENS KELLEY GAYNES, P.C.
5555 Glenridge Connector
Glenridge Highlands One - Suite 800
Atlanta, Georgia 30342
Tel: (404) 237-4100
Fax: (404)364-0126
skern@kkgpc.com
jhoffman@kkgpc.com

For Defendants Hotel Equities Group, LLC,
HEI Investments, LLC, Hotel Equities
Development Ill, LLC, Frederick W Cerrone,
and Dennis A. Meroney (Third Party Plaintiffs)
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